




Income Splitting for 
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While proponents say income splitting will support families raising
children, all families would not be equal in reaping the benefits.
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FISCAL ANDTAX COMPETITIVENESSIn the 2011 federal election the Conservative Party pledged to allow couples with minor
children to split up to $50,000 of their incomes each year for tax purposes. Tax savings would
arise to the extent that the spouses’ marginal tax rates differ. Advocates of splitting claim an
inequity in tax burdens for one-earner couples versus two-earner couples and often invoke the
image of the traditional family with mom at home minding the kids. This Commentary
provides a quantitative analysis of the economic impacts of the federal income splitting
proposal including the effects if the provinces adopted a similar scheme. Its findings include 
the following:
￿ Income splitting would reverse the relative position of one-earner and two-earner couples
with the same money incomes; on average, the two-earner couples would now bear the
heavier tax burdens.
￿ The gains would be highly concentrated among high-income one-earner couples: 
40 percent of total benefits would go to families with incomes above $125,000, and the
maximum annual gain from federal splitting would exceed $6,400. The maximum gains
from provincial splitting would range from zero in Alberta to $5,750 in Ontario.
￿ Of all households, 85 percent would gain nothing (including single parents), and even
among couples with children nearly half would gain nothing or less than $500.
￿ The annual revenue cost of the splitting proposal would be $2.7 billion for the federal
government and an additional $1.7 billion for the provinces if they were to follow suit.
￿ Extending the splitting proposal to all couples regardless of children would more than
double the revenue cost – to $5.6 billion for the federal treasury and $3.5 billion for all
the provincial governments (with $2.1 billion for Ontario alone), yielding a total annual
cost exceeding $9 billion.
￿ The splitting proposal would significantly raise marginal effective tax rates for most 
lower-earning spouses, thus imposing barriers for working or returning to work; this
would make married women more vulnerable by reducing their work experience.
The Commentary concludes that income splitting would fail to achieve its ostensible horizontal
equity goal. And if the objective is to provide support to families in raising children, it would
distribute most benefits where they are least likely to be needed. Splitting would also be revenue
costly and adverse to work incentives. We suggest changes to other parts of the tax and transfer
systems that would be more effective in addressing the true needs of families and taxpayers
more generally while avoiding the disadvantages of splitting.
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I
n the 2011 federal election the
Conservative Party of Canada
pledged to allow parents of minor
children to split their incomes for tax
purposes, with the change contingent
on the federal budget’s returning to
balance (see Conservative Party of
Canada 2011). 
Under this “Family Tax Cut” proposal, up to
$50,000 of income would become transferable
between spouses each year, with tax savings arising
to the extent that their marginal tax rates differ.
The argument for this reform is that it is unfair
for two couples with the same total income to
bear different total tax liability when their split of
earnings differs; in particular, the case of the one-
earner couple where the other spouse stays home
to mind children is often invoked. The Conservatives’
pledge followed a similar one in their 2005 election
platform – indeed, the notion of horizontal equity
embedded in the proposal was a primary basis for
the much earlier advocacy of a flat-rate personal
income tax by the Canadian Alliance and the
Reform Party.
1
The income-splitting proposal, however, would
not amount to minor tinkering with the Canadian
income tax system; rather, it carries considerable
importance for several reasons. First, it would
change a basic element of the income tax – the
unit of taxation – at least for couples with children.
Second, it could set a precedent for wider income
splitting of couples’ incomes, such as eliminating
the $50,000 annual limit or the requirement to
have dependent children.
2 Third, the associated
revenue cost of the proposal would be large – $2.7
billion annually for the federal treasury and $1.7
billion more for the provinces if they were to
parallel the change in their tax provisions. Fourth,
it would offer no tax reduction for the great
majority of Canadian households, while the
government revenue loss would lead to either a
curtailment of public services or an increase in
their tax burden to make up the shortfall. Finally,
the proposal raises key issues about tax policy that
the Conservatives did not mention, including
incentives, efficiency, gender neutrality, and the
effects on married women. 
This Commentary examines the Conservatives’
income-splitting proposal quantitatively to identify
what groups would gain and by how much and
the effects of the proposal on work and family
formation incentives. It also briefly assesses related
tax policy issues and alternative reforms that could
achieve some of the same purposes but with
different distributional effects and less distortion
to incentives. Our computations assume that the
provinces would follow any federal income tax
change of this nature, as they did in 2006 when
Ottawa introduced income splitting for eligible
pension income of seniors. Provincial participation
is not an essential feature of the reform, although
the provinces (except for Quebec) might be
constrained by their Tax Collection Agreements
with Ottawa that require them to use a common
definition of taxable income. If the provinces
chose not make such a change, the effects would
be about one-third smaller than our figures,
depending on the province. We further assume
that splitting would be permitted for both
employment/self-employment earnings and
property/investment income, since the Conservatives’
proposal did not distinguish between the two
The authors thank the members of the C.D. Howe Institute’s Fiscal and Tax Competitiveness Council for helpful discussion or written
comments, as well as James B. Davies, Lisa Philipps, Finn Poschmann, Bill Robson, Frances Woolley, and several anonymous reviewers. The
authors bear responsibility for all views and any errors. 
1 For analysis of the earlier argument that a flat tax would eliminate horizontal inequity across couples with different splits in their earnings,
and the relationship to income splitting, see Kesselman (2000). 
2 Already, the Ontario Conservative Party has made a 2011 election campaign pledge to introduce “income sharing” up to $50,000 for all
couples, with or without children (Howlett 2011). Ontario Conservative leader Tim Hudak had introduced a private member’s bill on
income splitting in the provincial legislature in 2008. We present cost estimates of the Ontario Conservatives’ proposal later in this Commentary.| 2 Commentary 335
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forms of income.
3 We also discuss the possible
merits of permitting couples to split their
property/investment income but not their labour
earnings, a practice found in several other countries.
Arguments For and Against 
Income Splitting 
In the Canadian tax system, the primary taxable
unit is the individual, who is assessed for tax
principally on the basis of his or her own income.
In practice, though, several features of the system
recognize family relations. For instance, taxpayers
can claim portions of unused child, spouse, or
dependent tax credits to reduce their tax payable;
4
tax-based benefits to persons and families are usually
determined on the basis of family income;
5 seniors
can split their eligible pension income for tax
purposes; spousal Registered Retirement Savings
Plans (RRSPs) can be used to split income between
spouses; and assets can be transferred from one
spouse to the other, albeit constrained by income-
attribution rules.
6 Thus, departures from use of
the individual as the basic tax unit relate either to
capital or pension income or to the transfer system
or subsidiary aspects of the income tax. At the
same time, the Canadian tax system tightly
constrains the ability to split labour earnings
between spouses other than through the hiring of
a spouse in a family business.
The principal expressed goal of income splitting
is to ensure that couples with similar total money
income pay similar amounts of tax – an application
of the horizontal equity principle that “equals”
should be taxed equally. However, critics of
income splitting argue that “equals” are more
appropriately gauged by broader measures of a
family’s total economic resources or consumption.
7
That approach would include the value of home-
produced services, such as cleaning, cooking, and
childcare, which is larger when one spouse spends
less time, or no time, in the paid labour force.
Such an approach would also deduct work-related
costs such as commuting, the need for appropriate
work clothing, and hired childcare or daycare. In
this perspective, a two-earner family is not the
“equal” of a one-earner couple that has the same
total money income, because the latter couple has
more in-kind income from home-produced
services and fewer work-related expenses.
Another goal of income splitting, implicit in the
Conservatives’ scheme, is to give parents greater
ability to spend time at home caring for their
children. This choice could be exercised by, for
example, one parent’s working part time, rather
than full time, or stopping work entirely. Yet this
goal and that of horizontal equity make a curious
mix, for two reasons. First, if income splitting
were a prima facie requirement for fairness among
couples with varying earnings splits, then on what
basis can splitting be restricted to couples with
dependent children? Second, income splitting is
an odd policy choice if a major objective is to help
parents spend more time on child rearing. It
would be of the most benefit to couples that are
already the most able to reduce one spouse’s work
and of the least benefit to couples with the least
3 Thus, whenever we use the term “earn” or “earner,” we are referring to the individual’s total income. However, in all numerical illustrations,
we assume that all the income is in fully taxable forms such as labour and interest income, rather than of a type that is taxed at preferential
rates, such as capital gains and Canadian dividends.
4 These provisions differ from the issues raised by income splitting, since the credits are valued at flat, rather than progressive, rates; see our
later discussion of the spousal credit.
5 This type of family-based income testing usually works to the disadvantage of couples with discrepant incomes, since individual-based
income testing more often provides benefits to the lower earner.
6 The income-attribution rules tax the income from property transferred between spouses in the return and at the rate of the transferor rather
than the transferee, unless special conditions have been met on the transfer. For a recent review of income-splitting strategies, see Jacob and
Lee (2010). 
7 See Kesselman (2008) for a comprehensive, critical review of the arguments and related evidence. For earlier Canadian treatment of related
issues, see Boessenkool and Davies (1998) and Vincent and Woolley (2000). All these studies conclude that income splitting for couples
would not be desirable policy. For one Canadian study that supports income splitting, see Mintz (2008).Commentary 335 | 3
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ability to do so (not to mention single parents).
8
Our later quantitative results confirm this point. 
Thus, on a principled economic basis, the
argument for income splitting by couples with
children faces several challenges. Moreover, relatively
few countries allow general income splitting – or
joint taxation more broadly – citing its creation of
gender inequities, distortions of marital incentives,
work disincentives for the lower-earning spouse,
and other economic inefficiencies. We examine
some of these issues briefly in our analysis of the
federal Conservatives’ proposal. Our purpose in
this Commentary is not to resolve these differences
of perspective, but to cast light on the distributional,
revenue, and other economic implications of the
income-splitting proposal.
Does Horizontal Inequity Exist? 
If one accepts the “money income” basis for
comparing couples and the implied higher tax
burden of couples whose partners have disparate
earnings, how large is this horizontal inequity? We
compute the pattern of the tax burden at various
total family income levels separately for different
splits in spouses’ earnings. In particular, we
consider the cases where the income of the lower-
earning spouse is less than 15 percent and more
than 35 percent of family income; each case
constitutes about one-third of all two-parent
families with dependent children. We take into
account such provisions as the childcare expense
tax deduction and income-tested credits and
benefits that are linked and/or delivered via the
personal income tax.
9 We also include employees’
payroll taxes (or “premiums”) for employment
insurance (EI) and the Quebec/Canada Pension
Plan (Q/CPP), since these are part of households’
tax burden.
10
Figure 1 compares the average tax burden of
families with children where the two spouses earn
relatively similar and relatively dissimilar total
income. As expected, at most income levels,
families with earnings unevenly distributed
between spouses bear, on average, a heavier tax
burden than those where the spouses’ incomes are
relatively similar. At lower income levels, the tax
burden is negative since transfer payments received
from governments exceed taxes paid. From the
point where the tax burden becomes positive (at
around $50,000 of family income) to about
$80,000, the average tax burden of families with
unevenly distributed income exceeds that of
families with similar spouses’ incomes by an
amount ranging approximately between $500 and
$1,500; the same is true for family-income levels
above $100,000.
Although such a difference in average tax
burden is not trivial, at first sight the progressive
nature of the tax system might suggest that
families with similar spousal incomes should have
a pronounced tax advantage, especially at higher
income levels. In fact, the gap in the relative tax
burden of the two types of families is mitigated in
large part by payroll taxes. For the same total
family income above middle levels, payroll charges
for EI and Q/CPP are higher for dual-earner
families than they are for single-earner families,
reflecting the operation of annual earnings
ceilings. If one ignores payroll taxes, the tax
advantage enjoyed by dual-earner families rises to
between $1,500 and $4,000.
The tax treatment of childcare expenses also
affects these differences. Since childcare costs are
deductible by the lower-income spouse, the tax
8 Some more natural policy choices, such as enhancements to the Child Tax Credit or the Universal Child Care Benefit (both creations of the
Conservative federal government), are discussed later.
9 We include the Canada Child Tax Benefit, the Working Income Tax Credit, and GST/HST credits, as well as similar provincial income-
tested credits.
10 One could argue for excluding these premiums since they are linked to benefit eligibility, but for EI this linkage is very loose, and for the
Q/CPP the prospective benefits are often far in the future. Additionally, about two-fifths of Q/CPP premiums are used to finance benefits


















Lower-Income Parent Earns Less Than 15% of Family Income 
Lower-Income Parent Earns More Than 35% of Family Income 
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Note: The chart shows the average family net tax burden calculated for each income decile. Deciles divide the income range into ten equal
parts, so that the bottom decile, for example, represents the 10 percent of families whose income is lower than the next 90 percent.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada’s SPSD/M, v.18.1. 
Figure 1: Average Net Tax Burden, by Family Income and Earnings Split between Parents, 2012
value of the deduction is higher for families with
more evenly distributed incomes. That dual-earner
families spend more on childcare on average than
do single-earner families compounds this advantage.
Yet, a broader measure of a family’s economic
resources available for ordinary consumption
should subtract childcare costs in comparing
“equals” to assess horizontal equity, and these costs
are higher for most two-earner couples with
young children. Alternatively, one could measure
the value of childcare provided by a parent in the
home, which is larger for most single-earner
couples, and add that to the money income of
families. When the net-of-tax expense of childcare
is added to a family’s tax burden as a drain on
income, any financial advantage dual-earner families
enjoy mostly disappears, as shown in Figure 2.
In summary, the current tax system imposes a
heavier tax burden on families with the same total
money income where the two spouses have relatively
unequal incomes. The extra burden is relatively
small, however, if we factor in the higher payroll
tax incurred by two-earner couples. When we
consider the additional outlays for childcare
expense (even net of the associated tax savings),
we find that dual-earner couples have net-of-tax
resources available for consumption that are very
similar to those single-earner couples across a wide
range of total family incomes. Since childcare is
just one of the additional expenses borne by theCommentary 335 | 5
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dual-earner couple, considering other work-related
expenses (or, conversely, the single-earner couple’s
extra home-produced services beyond childcare)
would only accentuate their different tax burdens
– and in a way favourable to the single-earner family.
How Income Splitting Would Work 
A couple would gain from income splitting by
being able to shift taxable income from the spouse
in a higher tax bracket to the spouse in a lower
bracket. The tax savings would equal the product
of the amount shifted and the difference between
the spouses’ two marginal tax rates.
11 If income
splitting were permitted without limits, this could
be accomplished simply by having eligible couples
with children file a joint tax return in which all of
the tax brackets are twice as wide as for other
taxpayers. With the Conservatives’ proposed
$50,000 limit, however, income splitting most
likely would be implemented through discretion
about the amount of taxable income that a higher-
earning spouse could shift to the lower-earning
spouse. As with current provisions for pension
income splitting, the proposed family income












































Lower-Income Parent Earns Less Than 15% of Family Income 
Lower-Income Parent Earns More Than 35% of Family Income 
Family Income
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada’s SPSD/M, v.18.1. 
Figure 2: Average Net Burden of Taxes and Childcare Expenses, by Family Income and Earnings Split
between Parents, 2012 
11 Computing the tax saving is more complex when the shifting is not across two adjacent tax brackets, or when one spouse has partly unclaimed
deduction amounts, non-transferable tax credits, or deductions that could be claimed against income taxed at a higher marginal rate.| 6 Commentary 335
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12 This spousal amount has been criticized as an unwarranted form of fiscal supprt for stay-at-home spouses, particularly when they have no
young children; see Law Commission of Canada (2001) and Kershaw (2002).
13 That three provinces have ratios exceeding that of the federal income tax, indicating greater tax rate progressivity at the provincial level, runs
counter to the idea that labour mobility supports lesser tax progressivity at the subnational than at the national level (see Kesselman 2000).
14 Although income splitting would not yield any gain through a lower statutory tax rate, the lower-income spouse could save tax through
better use of non-transferable credits and deductions.
transfers of income and would require the consent
of both spouses. Including property/investment
income could complicate the provision considerably,
since capital gains are taxed at preferential half-
rates and Canadian dividends are both grossed up
and granted a non-refundable tax credit. 
The progressivity of personal tax rates is crucial
in determining the benefits of income splitting. 
In 2011, the federal taxable income brackets are:
$0–$41,544 (15 percent), $41,544–$83,088 (22
percent), $83,088–$128,800 (26 percent), and
$128,800+(29 percent). For couples that would
be eligible under the Conservatives’ proposal, tax
savings would arise only if the two spouses’ taxable
incomes are in different brackets, and the savings
would depend on the difference in the spouses’
initial marginal tax rates and on the amount that
could be shifted before the two rates were equalized.
By equalizing marginal tax rates, we mean that the
two spouses move into the same tax bracket, with
one or both possibly at the upper or lower
boundary of that bracket. The examples in Box 1
illustrate how splitting would operate under
various scenarios. High-income couples that are
constrained by the $50,000 limit might still be in
different tax brackets after splitting their incomes.
One feature of the federal personal tax system,
the “spouse or common-law partner amount,”
might appear to be a limited form of income
splitting between spouses, but in fact it operates in
a very different way. This provision allows the
higher-earning spouse to claim the portion of a
basic personal amount that the lower-earning
spouse cannot use to shield income.
12 In 2011,
both amounts are the same, at an exemption-
equivalent of $10,527 – that is, if the lower-earning
spouse had no income, the higher-earning spouse
can shield an additional $10,527 of income from
tax. This additional sum escapes tax only at the
federal bottom-bracket rate of 15 percent and not
at the higher-earning spouse’s marginal tax rate.
Thus, the spousal amount does not diminish tax
progressivity in the way that income splitting does.
If the provinces (and territories) joined the
federal government in introducing income splitting,
then the progressivity of their rate schedules also
would come into play. In most, the threshold for
the top rate bracket is lower than the federal
threshold of $128,800; several provinces begin
their top bracket at taxable incomes as low as
$60,000-$70,000. Yukon and Nunavut match the
federal threshold, while only Nova Scotia exceeds
it, at $150,000. Moreover, some provincial rate
schedules are more steeply progressive than the
federal schedule, with top bracket rates more than
twice the bottom bracket rates; the ratio is less
than two for the federal tax.
13 Given these
discrepant rate schedules and boundaries, a couple
might be able to gain from income splitting under
the provincial tax but not under the federal tax;
the converse would also be possible. With its tax
at a flat 10 percent of taxable income, Alberta’s
eligible couples would gain almost nothing from
provincial income splitting
14 – thus illustrating
how a flat-rate tax eliminates the so-called
horizontal inequity arising for couples with
progressive taxation.
Who Would Not Gain from 
Income Splitting?
Many Canadian couples and households would
gain no tax savings from the Conservatives’
proposed income-splitting plan. Limiting the
provision to households with one or more
dependent children under age 18 obviously would
exclude single adults living alone, single parentsCommentary 335 | 7
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(who have no spouse for splitting), childless
couples, couples with only grown children, and
other households with more than one adult
(related or unrelated) but no spouse and no child
under age 18. In addition, many couples with one
or more dependent children would gain nothing
or very little from income splitting if neither
spouse earns more than the bottom-bracket level
of taxable income ($41,544) or if both spouses
have earnings that place them in the same tax
bracket. Of course, even if both spouses initially
were in the same bracket, allowing them to split
incomes would allow one spouse to curtail work
and thus potentially benefit from splitting.
Box 1: Illustrative Examples of the Operation of Income Splitting
Three scenarios show how income splitting would operate with respect to federal income tax (for the tax
brackets in 2011). They ignore any potential interactions between the split income and other provisions
of the tax and benefit systems that hinge on an individual spouse’s net or taxable income. All dollar
figures given in the examples pertain to taxable incomes.
Case A: Without splitting, Tom has income of $25,000 (in the 15 percent bracket), while his spouse
Katy has income of $45,000 (in the 22 percent bracket). With the option to split incomes, Katy shifts
$3,456 to Tom, placing each of their taxable incomes within (Tom at $28,456) or at the top of (Katy at
$41,544) the 15 percent tax bracket. Note that this couple does not need to equalize their taxable
incomes to gain the maximum benefit from splitting; they simply need to shift income at least to the
point where their marginal tax rates are equalized. Katy could shift more income to Tom, and they
would still both remain in the 15 percent bracket with no additional tax savings. The couple’s total tax
savings from splitting are the amount shifted ($3,456) multiplied by the differential between the two
tax rates (22% – 15% = 7%), or $242.
Case B: Without splitting, Susie is a stay-at-home parent with taxable income of zero, while her spouse
Gerald has income of $90,000 (in the 26 percent bracket). In paying his taxes, Gerald claims both his
own $10,527 basic personal amount plus an equal sum for the spousal amount (thus shielding $21,054
from the bottom-bracket rate of 15 percent at which credits are computed). With the option to split
incomes, Gerald shifts $41,544 to Susie, placing each of their taxable incomes within (Gerald at
$48,456) or at the bottom of (Susie at $41,544) the 22 percent bracket. (As in Case A, Gerald could
shift more to Susie, and even equalize their taxable incomes, but this would not yield any additional tax
savings.) The couple’s savings from splitting are the amount shifted out of Gerald’s 26 percent bracket
($90,000 – $83,088 = $6,912) times the differential with the 15 percent bracket into which it is shifted,
or $760, plus the amount shifted out of Gerald’s 22 percent bracket ($41,544 – $6,912) times the
differential with the 15 percent bracket, or $2,424, for a total of $3,184. Gerald’s loss of the spousal
amount when splitting income can be ignored, because Susie acquires an equivalent basic amount when
she files.
Case C: Without splitting, Viju has part-time earnings of $20,000 (in the 15 percent bracket), while
her spouse Ashok has income of $150,000 (in the top rate bracket of 29 percent). With the option to
split incomes, Ashok shifts the maximum allowable $50,000 to Viju, which puts him into the 26 percent
bracket and his spouse into the 22 percent bracket. The limit on splitting prevents these spouses from
equalizing their marginal tax rates and also limits the amount of tax savings they can achieve from
splitting incomes. In this case, their total tax savings are nevertheless a healthy $4,144 (the computation
is still more complex than in Case B).| 8 Commentary 335
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Table 1 displays our estimates of the percentages
of different types of households that would gain
and not gain from income splitting. Recall that
our estimates assume that both federal and
provincial income taxes permit income splitting
for families. We find that about 85 percent of all
households would gain nothing from the
proposal, and a further 6 percent would gain very
little ($500 or less per year). Only 15 percent of
all households would enjoy any tax savings from
income splitting, and even among couples with
minor children nearly half would gain little or
nothing. The proportion of households gaining
would be further reduced if splitting were
confined to federal taxes. In short, not only would
the great majority of Canadian households gain
nothing from income splitting; they could be
losers on account of the scheme’s revenue cost and
associated curtailment of public services or
compensating tax hikes.
Who Would Gain and by How Much?
Those who potentially could gain from the
income-splitting proposal are two-parent families
with one or more dependent children under age
18. As Table 1 shows, nearly half of that group
would obtain only modest tax savings or none at
all, but some families would be able to shift the
full limit of $50,000 of taxable income from a
primary earner who is in the top bracket to an at-
home spouse with no earnings, saving the couple
$6,408 in federal tax.
15 In addition, as Table 2
shows, the couple’s provincial tax savings would
range from zero in Alberta to as much as $5,748
in Ontario – where the couple would have maximum
total federal plus provincial tax savings of $12,156.
Without a limit on the amount of income that
could be split, the same illustrative couple would
save $10,096 in federal taxes alone. Even with the
proposed limit, however, the couple could save
more than 60 percent of the potential amount
from having no limit, since the amount shifted
15 For the maximum tax savings, this example also assumes that the primary earner’s income is sufficiently large as to remain in the top tax
bracket even after the income shifting. Our calculation further ignores the possible interaction between income splitting and the treatment of
the income shifted to the lower-earning spouse via other tax provisions that hinge on the lower-earning spouse’s income (such as childcare
expense deduction and the taxability of the Universal Child Care Benefit, received for children under age six).
Table 1: Gainers and Non-gainers from Income Splitting, Distribution by Type of Household, 2012 
Note: Households are census families. Two or more census families may share the same dwelling. Income splitting is limited to $50,000 
per family with minor children and is applied in the federal and provincial taxes.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada’s SPSD/M, v.18.1; responsibility for the results and their interpretation lies with 
the authors.




Couples with no child under 18 31
Couples with a child or children under 18 2
Small gainers (< $500), couples with child under 18 6
Large gainers (> $500), couples with child under 18 9
Total 100Commentary 335 | 9
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would fill up the non-earning spouse’s bottom tax
bracket, where the tax savings are greatest. In
practice, then, the proposed dollar limit would
constrain few of the couples that would benefit
from income splitting.
Table 3 displays the percentage distribution of
total tax savings from income splitting, with eligible
families classified into three groups hinging on the
earnings disparity of the two spouses. For couples
with the greatest disparity (where the lower-income
spouse earns 0–15 percent of family income), the
tax savings cluster around the larger tabulated
figures of more than $1,000 per year. About half
of these single (or nearly single) earners would
garner annual tax savings exceeding $2,000, while
more than 20 percent of this group would gain
more than $5,000. For couples with the least
disparity (where the lower-income spouse earns
35–50 percent of family income), the tax savings
cluster around the smaller tabulated figures of less
than $300 per year. Couples with an intermediate
degree of disparity (where the lower-income
spouse earns 15–35 percent of family income)
cluster in the mid- to upper range of the distribution
of tax savings. Fully 48 percent of all eligible families
would garner savings of $500 or less per year.
Table 4 displays average tax relief in dollars by
income groups and parents’ income disparity. In
the upper panel of the table, each cell represents
about 8 percent of all families: about 25 percent
of families are in each income group, and about a
third of families are in each family group defined
by earnings disparity. The average tax relief for
families earning more than $125,000 would reach
$6,443 when the parents earn very unequal
incomes, but only $351 when their incomes are
more evenly split. Tax relief would diminish
sharply for lower levels of family income, reflecting
the progressivity of the income tax system and the
much more limited scope of these households to
Table 2: Maximum Tax Savings from Splitting with a $50,000 Limit, by Province, 2011
Notes:
a Top rate includes the effect of the surtax in Ontario and Prince Edward Island.
bTabulated threshold includes the effective threshold for the top surtax for Ontario and Prince Edward Island.
c Because of special fiscal arrangements, for Quebec the maximum federal tax savings from splitting would be $5,351.











Alberta 1.00 n/a 0
New Brunswick 1.57 120,796 1,537
Saskatchewan 1.36 116,911 1,818
Newfoundland and Labrador 1.73 63,807 2,044
Manitoba 1.61 67 ,000 2,930
Quebec  1.50 78,120 3,562
Prince Edward Island 1.87 98,145 3,678
British Columbia 2.91 100,787 4,523
Nova Scotia 2.39 150,000 4,957
Ontario 3.45 78,361 5,748
Federal 1.93 128,800 6,408
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shift income. The average tax relief for families
earning no more than $55,000 per year would be
less than one-fifth that for families earning over
$125,000.
The lower panel of Table 4 displays how the
total tax relief from income splitting is distributed
across the income quartiles for two-parent families
with children. Clearly, the relief would be skewed
toward the upper quartiles: the top 25 percent of
families by family income would receive 41 percent
of the total relief (federal plus provincial). In
contrast, the bottom quartile would receive just 
7 percent of the total. Moreover, 23 percent of all
relief (or more than $1 billion) would go to the 
8 percent of two-parent families in the top
quartile and in which the lower-earning spouse
earns less than 15 percent of the family’s income.
As the table shows, the relief from income splitting
would be skewed somewhat more toward the
upper quartiles at the federal level than would be
the case at the provincial tax level. This difference
likely reflects the narrower tax brackets and lower
income thresholds for the top bracket in most
provincial tax schedules relative to the federal tax
(as well as the fact that Alberta’s flat tax would
yield almost no relief from income splitting).
The Effects of Income Splitting 
The Revenue Cost 
Table 5 shows our estimates of the annual revenue
cost of the Conservatives’ income splitting
proposal at $2.7 billion for the federal government
and $1.7 billion for the provinces if they were to
follow suit. As far as the distribution of the
revenue cost (and tax relief) is concerned, it is no
surprise that families where the spouses earn
dissimilar incomes would be the major beneficiaries
of this policy. Families where the lower-income
spouse earns less than 15 percent of the family’s
total income would receive more than 60 percent
of the total benefits of the provision, and they
C.D. Howe Institute
Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Families, by Amount of Tax Savings from Income Splitting and
Earnings Splits, 2012
Notes: Families are dual-parent families with minor children and up to $50,000 per family may be split between parents. Tax savings are 
federal plus provincial and assume that the provinces adopt the same splitting scheme. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada’s SPSD/M, v.18.1. 
Amount of Family Tax Savings
Families Where the Lower-Income Parent Earns…
from 0% to 15% of
family income
from 15% to 35% of
family income




nil 15 6 15 12
1–100 4 9 33 16
101–300 6 9 22 13
301–500 4 6 10 7
500–1,000 8 18 13 13
1,001–2,000 11 27 6 14
2,001–5000 31 24 1 18
5,000 and over 21 2 0 8
All 100 100 100 100Commentary 335 | 11
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Table 4: Average Family Tax Relief as a Result of Income Splitting, by Income Group and Earnings 
Splits within the Family, 2012 
Notes: Households are census families. Income splitting is limited to $50,000 per family with minor children. Tax savings are federal plus
provincial and assume that the provinces adopt the same splitting scheme.

















from 0% to 15% of 
family income
32 592 2,652 4,664 6,443 2,791
from 15% to 35% of 
family income
32 266 1,035 1,677 2,325 1,439
from 35% to 50% of 
family income
36 115 302 351 351 303
All 100 409 1,290 1,780 2,364 1,469
Proportion of all 
families (%)
– 25 25 25 25 100
Proportion of federal 
relief (%)
– 6 21 32 41 100
Proportion of 
provincial relief (%)
– 8 24 26 42 100
Proportion of total 
relief (%)
– 7 22 30 41 100
would see their disposable income jump by 
3.4 percent on average. In sharp contrast, families
where the spouses have much more similar
earnings would receive just 7 percent of total
savings, and their disposable incomes would rise
by just 0.4 percent. The intermediate group of
families by earnings disparity would receive 
31 percent of the total benefits and enjoy a 
1.6 percent increase in disposable income.
In Table 6, we break down the revenue cost by
province and show the cost of income splitting
separately for federal and provincial income taxes,
again assuming that provinces follow the federal
initiative’s limit and scope. In part because of its
large population, Ontario accounts for the largest
revenue cost for both federal and provincial
splitting. However, the steep progressivity of
Ontario income tax rates accentuates the revenue
cost for provincial tax splitting. The revenue cost
for Ontario if restricted to splitting with children
is $1.14 billion, nearly equal to the $1.16 billion
federal revenue cost in that province.
16
16 If Ontario were to adopt the provincial Conservative Party’s proposal to extend splitting to all couples, regardless of the presence of
dependent children, the provincial revenue cost would rise to $2,100 million. This high figure also reflects the province’s relatively high
degree of progressivity in its income tax.| 12 Commentary 335
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Table 6 additionally reports our estimates for
the proportion of the federal and provincial
revenue costs – and thus tax savings – attributable
to families with incomes above $125,000 in each
province. Quebec is a big outlier on this measure,
with 61 percent of provincial tax savings in that
province going to high-income families versus an
average of 42 percent for all provinces. This pattern
reflects the operation of Quebec’s relatively flat
rate structure combined with a non-refundable tax
credit rate equal to that of the second-highest
income tax bracket. Concentration of the tax
savings from federal income splitting in higher-
income families averages 41 percent nationally,
but it is distinctly higher in Alberta at 55 percent
and in Newfoundland and Labrador at 53 percent.
Since taxpayers in all the provinces face the same
federal income tax rate schedule, these outliers
must reflect solely the differences in the distribution
of family incomes in those provinces.
We should note that our estimates are based on
a Statistics Canada model that does not account
for behavioural responses to policy changes. Given
the incentives income splitting would pose, the
likely revenue costs in reality could be significantly
higher. As we discuss in more detail below, income
splitting would induce some married spouses –
mostly women – to reduce their hours of work,
others to withdraw from the labour force, and still
others to choose not to re-enter the labour force
after withdrawing to mind infants or young
children. All of these responses would reduce that
spouse’s taxable earnings and taxes paid. Moreover,
their partner’s tax liabilities also could decline,
because their gains from splitting would increase
in response to the spouse’s decreased earnings.
The Effects on Families’ Relative Tax
Positions 
When we compare the tax burdens of families
with the income-splitting proposal, a complete
reversal of the trend observed in Figure 1 emerges.
At almost all levels of family income, the average
tax burden of dual-earner families where the
lower-earning parent contributes more than 
35 percent of the family’s income would exceed
that of single-earner families where one parent
earns less than 15 percent of family income, as
shown in Figure 3. For families with income
above about $65,000, in particular, the tax burden
would be lower in the uneven-earner families than
in dual-earner families by $3,000-$4,500 on
average. Thus, instead of being overtaxed relative
to dual-earning couples with the same total money
incomes, single-earning couples would now be
undertaxed.
Table 5: Cost to Governments and Distribution by Earnings Splits within the Family, 2012
Notes: Families are dual-parent families with minor children. Provincial and federal fiscal costs represent reduction of government revenues 
as a result of income splitting of up to a maximum of $50,000 per family.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada’s SPSD/M, v.18.1. 











from 0% to 15% of family income 1,040 1,690 61 32
from 15% to 35% of family income 550 850 31 32
from 35% to 50% of family income 140 190 7 36
All Families 1,720 2,730 100 100Commentary 335 | 13
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As noted previously, payroll taxes account for
much of this difference. While removing payroll
taxes from consideration would lower the tax-
burden advantage enjoyed by single-earner families,
it would still be, on average, about $1,000-$2,500.
One reason for the tax differentials favouring
uneven-earner families is the childcare expense
deduction, which is more valuable to uneven-
earner couples after splitting than before. There
are also deduction amounts and non-transferable
tax credits for which lower-income spouses may
not have enough taxable income to be able to
claim before splitting, but which become
claimable after splitting. If we consider the burden
of additional childcare and other expenses borne
by dual-earner couples, the disadvantage of
income splitting to dual-earner couples with the
same level of real resources as single-earner couples
would become even larger.
The Effects on Work Incentives 
Income splitting would affect work incentives for
eligible couples. The research literature on this
topic has addressed both the impact on the
marginal effective tax rate (METR) of each
partner and the tax “hurdle” the lower-earning
spouse faces in choosing whether to re-enter the
labour force – likely after taking time out to mind
infants or young children.
17 One finding is that
income splitting can raise the METR on the
earnings of the lower-earning spouse and/or
decrease it on those of the higher-earning spouse.
Since the lower-earning spouse is typically the
Table 6: Distribution of Federal and Provincial Costs of Income Splitting, by Province, 2012 
Notes: For Ontario the provincial revenue cost if splitting were extended to all couples irrespective of whether they have children is 
computed as $2.1 billion.













Alberta negligible 490 n/a 55
British Columbia 180 300 44 34
Manitoba 50 90 34 28
New Brunswick 20 50 21 39
Newfoundland and Labrador 20 50 33 53
Nova Scotia 60 70 27 37
Ontario 1,140 1,160 40 39
Prince Edward Island 5 10 24 29
Quebec  200 440 61 39
Saskatchewan 20 80 35 40
Total/average 1,720 2,730 42 41
17 Kesselman (2008) provides an extensive review of the theoretical and empirical economic research on the labour supply effects of income
splitting and the associated efficiency costs. Increased METRs can also affect various other behaviours, such as savings and tax avoidance,
that have both efficiency and revenue costs; see Canada (2010) and references cited therein.| 14 Commentary 335
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mother, and married women are much more
responsive in their work choices to variations in
tax rates than are married men, the overall effect
would be a decrease in total paid work hours and
an increased cost to economic efficiency. Moreover,
in many situations, income splitting would raise
the hurdle to re-entering the labour force, carrying
adverse implications for women in terms of their
work experience and potential long-term earnings.
Table 7 shows the effects of income splitting on
the METR of both the lower- and higher-earning
spouse. We simulated these figures for two-parent
families with income falling in the tabulated
income intervals for each of the two spouses. This
reason and the interactions with income-tested tax
and transfer benefits at lower incomes mean that a
few of the tabulated figures differ from the expected
signs. Moreover, all the figures on the diagonal of
the table (shaded cells) would be zero if both
spouses started with exactly the same income, so
the non-zero (but mostly small) figures result from
variability of incomes within the intervals. 
Apart from the cited items, the tabulated results
confirm the expected signs: income splitting
would typically raise the METR for the lower-
earning spouse and decrease it for the higher-
earning spouse. Some of the effects are large – on
the order of a ten-percentage-point hike for a low-
earning spouse when the other spouse earns over
$100,000. These results confirm the heightened
Lower-Income Parent Earns Less Than 15% of Family Income 




















Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada’s SPSD/M, v.18.1. 
Figure 3: Average Net Tax Burden after Income Splitting, by Family Income and Earnings Split between
Parents, 2012 Commentary 335 | 15
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tax hurdles for mothers in re-entering the labour
force. Overall, roughly 20 percent of lower-
earning spouses would see their METR raised by
more than 9 percentage points, and 5 percent
would face a more than 20 percentage point
METR hike. On the other hand, about 15 and 
5 percent of higher-earning spouses would see
their METR lowered by, respectively, more than 
8 and 15 percentage points.
The Effects on Equity and Marital Incentives
Income splitting raises issues of horizontal equity
in the taxation of single persons and couples with
equal-earning partners.
18 A couple enjoys
significant scale economies in housing and other
living costs and thus can live more cheaply
together than apart. If we consider these economies
in gauging consumption levels, equity dictates
Table 7: Change in METR for Incremental Earnings as a Result of Income Splitting 
Notes: Figures in the table are for the initial earnings level of each spouse. The top figure in each cell = change (in percentage points) in the
METR on incremental earnings (for a $100 increase) by the lower-earning spouse. The bottom figure (italic) = change (in percentage points)
in the METR on incremental earnings (for a $100 increase) by the higher-earning spouse.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada’s SPSD/M, v.18.1. 























































































































































18 For a review of the literature on equity comparisons between couples and singles and the effects of splitting on marital incentives, see
Kesselman (2008). The United States, in particular, has a long, contentious history of tax changes that alternately increased and decreased
marriage penalties and bonuses.| 16 Commentary 335
that the couple’s combined tax burden should be
heavier than that for two identical single persons.
For this reason, some countries’ systems of joint
taxation – a variant of income splitting – carry a
“marriage penalty” for couples where the partners’
earnings are not too dissimilar; the US federal tax
code contained such an approach until recently.
The “penalty” is implemented by having a
separate tax schedule for the combined income of
the two spouses where the brackets are less than
twice as wide as for single, unrelated taxfilers.
While this issue might not seem imminent in the
context of the federal Conservatives’ proposal,
income splitting’s high revenue cost and perceived
unfairness toward singles could become contentious
in future.
If income splitting does not recognize the scale
economies that couples enjoy, then “marriage
bonuses,” in the form of joint tax savings, can
occur. These bonuses are largest when the
partners’ earnings diverge widely and at higher
family incomes. Evidence from the United States
suggests that this advantage has little effect on the
decision to marry, but more on the timing of
weddings to obtain the tax benefits of being
married prior to year-end. In Canada, however,
these results would not apply since both marital
and common-law relationships (and both
opposite-sex and same-sex partners) qualify
equally for all tax provisions, including income
splitting, so long as they had dependent children.
Still, even under the Conservatives’ proposal, a
“marriage bonus” could occur when a non-
cohabiting single person with a child chooses to
cohabit or marry.
Policy Alternatives to Income Splitting 
Tax and Transfer Benefits Targeted at Children 
If a major objective of income splitting is to
permit parents to spend more time child rearing,
then it is a poor choice of policy instrument.
Splitting would provide no fiscal support for
single parents – those in greatest need of such help
– and little or none for lower-earning couples with
children. Instead, those who would benefit most
from income splitting would be the highest-earning
couples, many of whom will already have chosen
to have one parent curtail or cease paid employment
to mind children. For those couples, who are the
most able financially to choose at-home parenting
over paid work, the benefits of income splitting
would be a pure windfall. In short, income
splitting would provide support in a pattern
completely the reverse of what families at various
income levels need to spend more time caring for
their children.
The proposal to restrict income splitting to
couples with children under age 18 also seems
hard to justify. The period when children derive
the greatest benefit from having an at-home
parent, or from spending more time from a
parent, is during infancy and the pre-school years.
Thus, if only families with very young children
were eligible for income splitting, the provision’s
revenue costs could be reduced and its assistance
more effectively targeted. At the same time,
placing a cap of 18 years on the age of a dependent
child to be eligible for splitting ignores families’
increased financial burden when their children
move on to higher education.
Much better policy vehicles already exist to help
families spend more time caring for their children.
Prime candidates include the Child Tax Credit;
the Universal Child Care Benefit (if support is
meant to be universal, payable for all children
under age six); the Canada Child Tax Benefit
(provided clawback rates are not increased much
at low- to middle-income levels
19); and the EI
provision for parental leave (contingent on the
parent’s qualification through work history, and if
support is aimed at the first year of the child’s
life). All these programs are open equally to single-
and two-parent families, and any could be amended
C.D. Howe Institute
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or expanded as needed. Indeed, the $2.7 billion
federal revenue cost of income splitting would go
a long way if the money were spent instead on
helping families with very young children.
Across-the-Board Personal Income Tax Cuts 
If the intention of the income-splitting proposal is
to provide tax relief with a tilt favouring higher
earners, this could be achieved more effectively by
just cutting tax rates in the relevant brackets. This
would not target assistance at families with children,
but it would avoid the work and familial distortions
of income splitting and address equity concerns
about the exclusion of single parents and childless
couples and singles. Rate cuts for personal tax
would also pay dividends by increasing the
revenue base, since varied behavioural responses –
including tax avoidance and work, saving, and
investment decisions – are affected by marginal
tax rates. For example, a 10 percent cut in personal
METRs has been estimated to raise taxable
income by 2 to 7 percent (Canada 2010).
Responsiveness is greatest at the highest incomes,
so personal tax cuts stressing the upper brackets
would be partially self-financing.
Splitting for Investment and Property
Incomes
20
The Canadian tax system already contains many
methods by which astute, well-advised couples can
legally split their investment and property incomes.
A key question for horizontal equity is whether
fairness would be improved by removing the
income-attribution rules or by providing all
couples simple provisions for splitting their
combined investment income. Such reforms
would improve equity for couples who are not
well informed or well advised in tax and financial
matters. They could also bring other benefits:
lower costs for the tax authorities in policing the
system; reduced private expenditures on financial,
tax, and legal advisory services; and a sharper 
focus by couples on maximizing investment returns,
rather than on strategies to minimize their joint
taxes. Insofar as these changes would improve the
efficiency of capital markets, benefits would also
arise for society at large. However, an important
factor in assessing reforms of this kind is whether
they would apply to notional shifting or require
an actual transfer of legal and beneficial title to 
the property or income.
21 Actual transfer of title is
needed to promote gender equity, as many studies
have found that a spouse’s access to income conveys
power over spending and in the relationship 
more generally.
22
The Conservatives’ proposal would allow
couples to split their income from capital and
property sources, but without any requirement
that ownership of the asset be transferred. The
more radical part of the proposal would allow the
splitting of labour income, since investment income
can already be split to a substantial degree by a
variety of methods as previously noted. Several
countries have chosen to prohibit splitting of
labour income while providing ways for couples to
split investment income easily.
23 Splitting investment
income does not elicit the problems of labour
market distortions and barriers to married women
re-entering the labour force that arise with splitting
labour income. Thus, proposals for income
Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
20 This section draws heavily on Kesselman (2008, 22-25).
21 Examples of inter-spousal transfers of property and the associated income currently permitted by the tax system include pension income
splitting (notional transfers suffice) and spousal contributions to RRSPs and TFSAs (both entailing transfer of legal title).
22 See, for example, Kornhauser (1993) as well as other studies cited in Kesselman (2008) finding that most couples do not fully share their
individual incomes, with clear implications for income splitting that is based on purely notional shifts of the income between spouses.
23 Some examples include the unrestricted division of investment income between spouses by allowing asset transfers (United Kingdom); the
taxation of all investment income at a flat rate independent of the progressive rates applied to labour income (Finland, Norway, Sweden); and
the division of a couple’s total investment income equally between the two spouses (Belgium). See Kesselman (2008: 23).| 18 Commentary 335
splitting limited to investment and property
income are worthy of closer examination particularly
if they attend to the issue of gender equity.
24
Concluding Remarks 
Canada’s income tax system already recognizes
close relationships through its benefits-related
provisions and in allowing the transfer of unused
tax credits within families. Income splitting is
otherwise limited to pension incomes and the
various means by which couples can transfer
investment and property income. The federal
Conservatives’ proposal to allow income splitting
for two-parent families with dependent children
under age 18 would add a new dimension to the
tax recognition of personal relationships by
allowing transfers of labour earnings. It bears
emphasis that these are notional transfers for tax
purposes and do not require the actual shift of
income from the higher-earning spouse to the
lower-earning spouse. Our quantitative estimates
find that the consequences, in terms of both
revenue and distributional effects, would be large.
We find that, even without income splitting,
the tax differentials between single– and dual-earner
families with the same total money incomes are
smaller than anticipated, particularly when payroll
taxes are included. When the costs of childcare are
factored into the net resources of comparative
families, the differentials essentially disappear.
Thus, any broader measure of economic resources
that includes the additional costs borne by dual-
earner couples (or, alternatively, the additional
value of home-produced services by single-earner
couples) belies the claim that the current system
poses widespread inequity in the treatment of
couples with different earnings splits. Money
income alone is insufficient to gauge which
couples have equal resources and thus equal
taxpaying capacities.
The income-splitting proposal, in fact, would
lead to a complete turnaround: single-earner
families would go from bearing, on average, a
somewhat larger tax burden than dual-earner
families to having a lower burden. This reversal of
fortunes would prevail even if one disregarded
payroll levies, which are disproportionately
shouldered by dual-income families. If the policy
objective is to equalize the tax burden faced by
families with the same money incomes,
irrespective of how family income is divided
between the parents, then income splitting would
miss even that circumscribed target. And that
objective would not justify restricting splitting to
couples with dependent children.
The proposed income-splitting scheme with a
$50,000 limit and restricted to couples with
children would cost the federal treasury $2.7 billion
per year. If the provinces were to follow suit, it
would cost their treasuries another $1.7 billion,
though their costs would diverge widely. Alberta’s
cost would be minimal on account of that
province’s flat-rate tax schedule; in contrast,
Ontario’s relatively steep rate progressivity would
make its revenue cost nearly as large as the federal
cost for that province. Making income splitting
available to all couples, with or without children,
would raise the federal revenue cost to $5.6 billion
per year and the total provincial cost to $3.5 billion,
for a total cost exceeding $9 billion.
25
Income splitting would disproportionately
benefit single-earner families over dual-earner
families, with the former garnering almost 60
percent of the total gains at both the federal and
C.D. Howe Institute
24 See Philipps (2011) for a gender-based assessment favourable to income splitting of property and investment incomes to the extent that it
would facilitate actual equalization of wealth between spouses without entailing the work disincentives of labour income splitting.
25 Ontario’s revenue cost would rise to $2.1 billion under the provincial Conservatives’ pledge to allow splitting for all couples with or without
children versus the $1.14 billion when restricted to families with children. Moreover, unlike the federal Conservatives’ pledge, the provincial
party’s pledge is not contingent on eliminating the jurisdiction’s deficit. Thus, the Ontario Conservatives’ pledge is portentous for the future
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provincial levels. Average gains would range from
more than $6,000 for higher-income, single-
earner families to about $100 for lower-income,
dual-earner families. Moreover, the gains would be
highly concentrated: 23 percent of all relief (more
than $1 billion) would go to the 8 percent of two-
parent families with income over $125,000 in
which the lower-earning spouse contributes less
than 15 percent of that income. All two-parent
families with income over $125,000 would receive
more than 40 percent of the total relief at both the
federal and provincial levels.
In contrast to the families that would gain 
from splitting, 85 percent of all households would
gain nothing because they lack either a spouse
(individuals and single parents) or a child under
age 18. Even among two-parent families that
would be eligible for splitting, almost half would
gain little ($500 or less) or nothing. Moreover,
those who would gain only little or nothing would
almost certainly lose in a broader sense, since the
substantial revenue cost of income splitting would
necessitate reduced public benefits and services or
increases in other taxes. One can envisage alternative
policies – such as tax deductions or credits for
children – that would render a more equitable
distribution of benefits among affected families.
Beyond equity considerations and distributional
impacts, the proposal would also affect work
incentives. Many families that would benefit from
income splitting would forgo some of their tax
savings whenever the lower-income spouse chose
to work more. The METRs of many lower-earning
spouses would rise by ten percentage points or
more, which would induce some to reduce their
hours of paid work. Increased METRs would also
discourage some spouses, particularly mothers,
from re-entering the workforce after leaving to
care for young children, thus impairing their work
experience and depressing their lifetime earnings.
True, higher-earning spouses would often enjoy a
lower METR on earnings, but these usually are
men, who are much less likely to respond by
changing their work hours than are women.
Nevertheless, the net result would be a decline 
in total work hours, with adverse effects on
economic efficiency.
In short, the Conservatives’ proposal to permit
income splitting for two-parent families with
minor children would fail to achieve its particular
notion of horizontal equity, likely by overtaxing
dual-earner couples. It would also distribute gains
disproportionately to a small share of all households
(mostly at the highest incomes), fail to assist
families that most need help to spend more time
with their children, and create new distortions to
work incentives. At the same time, the income-
splitting proposal would cost participating
governments substantial tax revenues, which could
grow further with the expected behavioural
responses. Other policy instruments could be
better targeted for families most needing support,
or the funds could be used for general tax
reduction, without the adverse effects of splitting.
Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute | 20 Commentary 335
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